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Workmen's Compensation Laws. Mr. Stimson is the author
of Jurisdiction and the Power of Taxation, and of numerous
Law Review articles concerned with jurisdictional questions.
Notes
A PROBLEM IN THE PERSONNEL OF THE FEDERAL
CORPORATION
I.
The processes of government at times seem recurrent and
cyclical rather than evolutionary. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury the lack of a mature and adequate doctrine of the police
power was supplied in this country by a resort to the govern-
mentally owned and operated corporation as a means of controll-
ing through monopoly or competition certain forms of economic
activity.' Soon, however, this form of horizontal control began
to give place to an ever increasing imposition of administrative
regulations from above. At the time of the World War the
government had almost completely evacuated the field of business
enterprise and had retired into a regulatory Olympus from
whence it ruled the scene through legislative enactment and ad-
ministrative orders.2 With the War came a temporary reflores-
cence of the government corporation;3 but peace brought speedy
INotable examples are: the Bank of the United States, 1 Stat. 191
(1791); 3 Stat. 266 (1816); and see McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4
Wheaton 316; the various state banks, see Bank of the United States v.
Planters Bank of Georgia (1824) 9 Wheaton 904; Bank of Kentucky v.
Wister (1829) 2 Peters 318; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky (1837) 11 Peters
257; Darrington v. Bank of Alabama (1851) 13 Howard 12; states fre-
quently owned stock in railroad companies, see Western and Atlantic Rail-
road Company v. Carlton (1859) 28 Ga. 180; State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley(1872) 66 N. C. 59. For a case in which the United States subscribed for
stock in a state chartered canal company see 12 Ops. Atty. Gen. 350 (1868).
Refer to Field, Government Corporations, a Proposal (1935) 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 775.
2 Exceptions to this general tendency existed in the colonial possessions
of the United States. In the Canal Zone the government purchased and
operated the Panama Railroad Company; see 30 Ops. Atty. Gen. 508 (1915) ;
Panama Ry. Co. v. Curran (C. C. A. 5, 1919) 256 Fed. 768; Salas v. United
States (C. C. A. 2, 1916) 234 Fed. 842; Jacobson v. Panama Ry. Co. (C. C.
A. 2, 1920) 266 Fed. 344; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 19 (1908). In Alaska the
Alaska Northern Railway, Ballaine v. Alaska Northern ly (C. C. A. 9,
1919) 259 Fed. 183.
3The most familiar of the War corporations are: The'United States
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation 39 Stat. 731 (1916); The
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
liquidation; and, with minor exceptions, 4 this form of govern-
mental activity became atrophied during the post War decade.
On the other hand, bureaucratic controls had become so complex
and ubiquitous as rather to choke than to regulate their objects.,
With the advent of the New Deal the bureaucratic system threat-
ened to assume staggering proportions; this complication, how-
ever, brought with it a possible solution; for step by step with
the extension of new governmental controls has come the crea-
tion of an innumerable army of governmentally owned and oper-
ated corporations to share in and perhaps ultimately to relieve
the bureaucratic burden., Thus a type of control originally neces-
sitated by a lack of administrative machinery has now in part
been called into being by a very plethora of administrative
mechanisms. The cycle is complete.
But the traditional guise in which the federally owned cor-
poration appears should not be allowed to obscure the novel and
unorthodox uses to which it is being bent. As the government
makes its presence felt in spheres hitherto consecrated to private
enterprise, the mask it dons is corporate.7 There is reason to sus-
pect that the government corporation, which now appears as a
somewhat disconcerting intruder into the realm of private busi-
ness, may become a basic and permanent factor in the economic
society of the future. Its adaptibility to these important uses is
a matter of more than academic concern. Whether the govern-
United States Grain Corporation 40 Stat. 1917 (1917); The United States
Spruce Corporation 40 Stat. 888 (1918); The United States Housing Cor-
poration 40 Stat. 550 (1918); The War Finance Corporation 40 Stat. 506(1918).
4 The Inland Waterways Corporation 43 Stat. 360 (1924); The Federal
Intermediate Credit Banks 42 Stat. 1454 (1923).
For a perhaps prejudiced but nevertheless significant description of
the workings of bureaucratic government see Beck, Our Wonderland of
Bureaucracy (1932).6 Among the more important are: The Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion 47 Stat. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. sec. 601; The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 48 Stat. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. sec. 264; The Home Owners
Loan Corporation 48 Stat. 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. 1463; The Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Corporation 48 Stat. 1256 (1934); The Public Works Emer-
gency Housing Corporation (See Executive Order No. 6470 of November
1933; the corporation was organized under the general incorporation laws
of Delaware to serve as a federal agency under the general authority vested
in the Executive by N. I. R. A. 48 Stat. 200 (1933), 40 U. S. C. 401 a); The
Tennessee Valley Authority 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. 831; The Com-
modity Credit Corporation (see executive order No. 6340 of October 1933) ;
The Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation (1933) established by
Secretary of the Interior; The Production Credit Corporation 12 U. S. C.
1131 (1933).
7 The Tennessee Valley Authority in respect to its commercial activities
is perhaps the n~ost familiar example of governmental participation in busi-
ness as a competitor. Less obvious but even more significant is the effect
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with the vast possibilities of
creditor control over private debtors inherent in its loan operations.
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ment enters the economic forum to supply services for their own
sake, or to regulate through competitive "yardsticks," it must of
necessity shed some of the encrusted impedimenta which usually
adhere to political agencies and take on some of the flexibility of
the private enterprise. It is highly desirable that the government
agency act as nearly as possible as an autonomous, non political
unit competing on equal terms with the private businesses for
which it purports to serve as a "yardstick." 8 These advantages
in some measure have been attained by the government corpora-
tion. Freedom from accountability to the Comptroller-General
is an important step in the direction of financial autarchy.9 The
government corporation is suable as an individual for its con-
tracts and torts; the facile pleas of sovereign immunity generally
have been forbidden it.1- The problem of tax exemption presents
greater difficulty; both the private concerns which compete with
the government corporations, and the states in which the cor-
porations operate, complain of the unfairness of exempting these
instrumentalities from taxation.1 Legally the question still
awaits a definitive answer ;12 in practical effect, so far as the
8 See note (1934) 43 Yale L. Journal 815 dealing specifically with the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Van Doren, Government Owned Corporations(1926) at pp. 258-79, declares that the two primary advantages to be de-
rived from the use of the corporation are (1) a flexibility approximating
that of the private business concern, (2) freedom from the political influ-
ence incident to congressional budgeting.
In United States ex rel Skinner and Eddy Corporation v. McCarl,
Comptroller General (1927) 275 U. S. 1 it was held that the Comptroller
General had no authority to pass on claims against the Fleet Corporation;
the Court declared, "-an important, if not the chief reason for employing
these incorporated agencies was to enable them to employ commercial
methods and to conduct their operations with a freedom supposed to be
inconsistent with accountability to the Treasury under its established pro-
cedure of audit and control over the financial transactions of the United
States." (at p. 8) And see Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States
Sugar Equalization Board Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 575, at 587.
In a comparatively recent case a state owned bank was held not subject to
audit by the state auditor, State ex rel. v. Waters (1920) 45 N. D. 115, 176
N. W. 913. And see 37 Ops. Atty. Gen. 1, 7 (1932). Certain dangers in
financial autonomy have been pointed out by McGuire, Government by
Corporations (1925) 14 Va. L. Rev. 182.
1"0 On contract: Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation (1922) 258 U. S. 549; Olson v. United
States Spruce Production Corporation (1925) 267 U. S. 462; in tort:
Panama Railroad Company v. Minnix (C. C. A. 5, 1922) 282 Fed. 47 are
the leading cases. The authorities upholding this proposition are too numer-
ous for detailed enumeration. The early leading case is Bank of the United
States v. Planters Bank of Georgia (1824) 9 Wheaton 904. Exceptions will
be noted later.
11 See note (1934) 43 Yale L. Journal 815.
- The immunity of federally owned corporations from state taxation
finds stronge support in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheaton 316;
Osborn v. Bank of the United States (1824) 9 Wheaton 738. Also consult
such holdings as Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S.
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present is concerned, the solution has been reached by voluntary
concession on the part of the federal government; thus the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority is directed by statute to remit, in lieu of
taxes, a certain proportion of the gross proceeds from the sale of
power to the states in which the sales are made. 3 In these re-
spects, then, the government corporation is prepared to take its
place in the economic life of the nation, not as a mere arm of the
government, alternately trammeled by bureaucratic restrictions
and pampered by sovereign prerogatives, but rather as a self-
sufficient unit operating under the same conditions as the private
enterprises which it is competitively to regulate.1
But one problem of fundamental importance in the attainment
of autonomy remains. The possibilities of political control
through the appointment and removal of the managers of the
government corporation are such as to threaten the independence
elsewhere attained through freedom from financial and pro-
cedural restraints. Under the doctrine of Myers v. The United
States the executive possesses almost unlimited powers of ap-
pointment and removal of federal officers. 5 Yet the new govern-
ment corporation, if it is to perform its desired functions of
664; Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 180. The
War time corporations were accorded immunity by the courts. Clallam
County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 341; New Brunswick v. United
States (1928) 276 U. S. 547; King County v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet
Corporation (C. C. A. 9, 1922) 282 Fed. 950. These decisions, however, may
have been influenced by the fact that these bodies were instrumentalities
used in furtherance of the World War, rather than commercial ventures.
It is quite possible that the doctrine of South Carolina v. United States
(1905) 199 U. S. 437 may apply to state taxation of federal corporations
engaged in activities predominately commercial. For a recent instance of
federal taxation of a state owned corporation see North Dakota v. Olson
(C. C. A. 8, 1929) 33 Fed. (2nd) 848. Refer to Thurston, Government
Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. 465.
13 16 U. S. C. 831 (L). And Congress has expressly, although perhaps
unnecessarily, permitted state taxation realty held by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, 47 Stat. 9 (1932), 15 U. S. C. 610; the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, 48 Stat. 177 (1933), 12 U. S. C. 264 (p); The
Home Owners Loan Corporation, 48 Stat. 130 (1933), 12 U. S. C. 1463 (c).
14 "It is this tendency to regard agencies of the government as sections of
one vast hog trough from which anyone is justified in taking his fill if he
can push himself up to it that constitutes the great danger of public par-
ticipation in economic enterprizes." "If they (the courts) take a firm atti-
tude toward government proprietary corporations regarding them, to be
sure, as public trusts, but at the same time as commercial enterprises that
are to stand upon their own felt, bear their own burdens, and answer for
their liabilities, a real service will be rendered by the courts to the nation."
Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. at
501, 502.
5 Meyers v. United States (1926) 272 U. S. 52. The doctrine that the
power of appointment to office is essentially and solely executive has been
criticised; see note (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 426 showing early exercises of
the power by Congress. For a capable discussion, People v. Hurlbut (1871)
24 Mich. 44.
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efficient technological production of goods and services, should
be controlled by a staff of experts rendered relatively free from
political influence by certainty and length of tenure. The fear
that this independence cannot be attained has provided one of
the most effective weapons for those opposed to governmental
participation in commercial enterprise. It is a test that the
government corporation eventually must meet. Certainty of
tenure is not easily compatible with the executive power as de-
fined in Myers v. The United States. Although the writer of this
note has no desire to enter into political controversy, there is
reason to believe that under some conditions freedom from politi-
cal influence and certainty of tenure could better be obtained
were the power of appointment and removal vested in Congress,
or in an impartial board or agency elected by Congress, rather
than in the President. Thus far, of course, there has been little
attempt to place the appointment of the managers of the recently
created corporations beyond the executive power. Congress has
been content to place the function of appointment directly in the
President," or in administrative officers, 17 or to add a corporate
directorship to the duties already inhering in certain adminis-
trative offices.' 8 There may come a time, however, when the at-
tempt will be made to place the appointment of corporate man-
agers in the hands of a body elected by Congress, and thus to
avoid the possibility of facile executive removals, and the oppor-
tunities for political pressure therein involved. It is the purpose
of this note to examine the possibility of attaining this in spite
of, or rather as an exception to the rule of Myers v. The United
States. It will be necessary first to discuss the actual precedents
for legislative appointment of such corporate officials; then, as
a result of the paucity of authorities, to attempt a solution
through an examination of the nature of the government corpora-
tion and the functions it performs. Although the discussion will
include all forms of corporations owned in whole or in part by
the government, our interest is centered primarily in the type
which more nearly approximates the ordinary commercial cor-
poration in some of its functions-such as the Tennessee Valley
16 The Tennessee Valley Authority is to be managed by a board of three
directors appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, 16
U. S. C. 831; the board of directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion comprises the Secretary of the treasury and six others appointed by
the President with the consent of the Senate, 12 U. S. C. 601 if; The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation is managed by a board consisting the Comp-
troller General and two others appointed by the President, 12 U. S. C. sec.
264 (b).
17 The Home Owners Loan Corporation is managed by members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 12 U. S. C. 1463; Regional Agricultural
Credit Corporations by officers appointed by the Farm Credit Administra-
tion, and for Production Credit Corporations see 12 U. S. C. 1131ff.
is See note 16 supra.
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Authority and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; for it is
this type rather than that which is merely a somewhat disguised
administrative agency, which depends for its efficacy most par-
ticularly upon the solution of our problem.
II.
Legislative appointment of managers of government corpora-
tions is not new to the American political scene. An historical
survey must begin with the Smithsonian Institute which, al-
though perhaps not strictly a corporation, in its organization and
functioning constitutes a close approximation to a corporate
body. This institution from its origin has been governed by a
Board of Regents consisting partly of executive and judicial offi-
cials, partly of managers elected by Congress.,, Charitable and
educational institutions have from time to time been incorporated
in the District of Columbia, the incorporators specifically named,
managers specifically appointed by Congress and provisions
made for the incorporators to elect successor managers.20 Elec-
tion by Congress of seven of the ten members of the Board of
Managers of the incorporated "National Home for Disabled Vol-
unteer Soldiers" was provided for ;21 and it has been held that
such managers were not "officers" of the federal government as
to prevent congressmen from being elected to their number.22 The
exercise of these appointive powers by Congress has not been
challenged.
It was customary for the directors of the early state banks to
be elected by the state legislature. 23 Legislative appointments of
the trustees of state benevolent or edhcational corporations have
been upheld. 24 A contrary result was early reached in the case of
an attempt on the part of a state legislature to appoint the direc-
tors of a state owned railway corporations; the act was held an
invalid legislative usurpation of the executive function of ap-
19 9 Stat. 102 (1846).
20 The Howard Institute and Home, 14 Stat. 69 (1866), to be maintained
by donations; annual report to Secretary of the Interior; board of trustees
for the first year named by Congress; Carnaigie Institute of Washington
33 Stat. 575 (1904); American National Red Cross 33 Stat. 599 (1905),
Congress specifically named incorporators who were to elect six members
of the central governing committee; the President to appoint twelve others;
National Conservatory of Music of America 26 Stat. 1093 (1891). And note
Centennial Board of Finance 17 Stat. 203 (1872).
2124 U. S. C. 73.
22 26 Ops. Atty. Gen. 457 (1907).
23 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky (1837) 11 Peters 257; Darrington v. Bank
of Alabama (1851) 13 Howard 12.
24 Hovey v. State (1889) 119 Ind. 386, 21 N. E. 890; People v. Freeman
(1889) 80 Cal. 233, 22 Pac. 173; Richardson v. Young (1910) 122 Tenn.
471, 125 S. W. 664; but contra see State v. Kennon (1857) 7 Ohio St. 547;
Pratt v. Breckinridge (1910) 112 Ky. 1, 65 S. W. 136.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss3/7
NOTES
pointment.25 In this case, however, the state constitution con-
tained an express and positive prohibition against election of
officers by the general assembly.26
Precedents remained in this indeterminate state until the deci-
sion in Springer v. The Philippine Islands.27 The Philippine
Government owned substantially all of the stock in certain com-
mercial corporations. The Legislature passed an act vesting the
power to vote the government-owned stock in the National Coal
Company in the Governor General, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House; these legislative officers by means
of this power then elected the directors and managing agents of
the Company. The Organic Act of the Islands provided that "all
executive functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor General or within one of the executive departments
under the supervision and control of the Governor General."
The United States Supreme Court held that the appointment of
managers of the corporation was an executive function which the
legislature could not perform. When urged that the relation of
the government to the stock of the company was proprietary
rather than sovereign in nature, the Court replied, "The property
is owned by the government, and the government in dealing with
it, whether in its quasi-sovereign or in its proprietary capacity,
nevertheless acts in its governmental capacity." " .... It must
deal with the property of the government by making rules and
not by executing them. The appointment of managers (in this
instance corporate directors) of property or a business, is essen-
tially an executive act which the legislature is without capacity
to perform directly or through any of its members. ' '271 A dissent
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis was based on the now famous
dictum that the executive and legislative functions of our govern-
ment are not divided into "water-tight compartments"; and that,
since the acts of the corporation were of a commercial rather
than governmental nature, the voting of stock, a fortiori, could
not be an executive act.28
At first glance the majority opinion in Springer v. The Philip-
pine Islands would appear to seal our question with a negative
answer. It is submitted, however, that the case does not conclu-
sively dispose of the power of Congress to appoint corporate man-
agers; it may be distinguished on several grounds from our pres-
25 State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley (1872) 66 N. C. 59; State ex rel. Hower-
ton v. Tate (1873) 68 N. C. 546; and see People ex rel. Nichols v. McKee
(1873) 68 N. C. 429; People v. Bledsoe (1873) 68 N. C. 457.
2 State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, supra note 25.
27 (1928) 277 U. S. 189.
27 Ibi. at p. 203.
28 Ibi. at page 211; and note "-ownership would not make voting upon
the stock an executive function of the government when the acts of the
corporation were not." at p. 212.
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ent problem: the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands, as has
been noted, contains a far more explicit and mandatory limita-
tion of "executive" power to the Governor General than the pro-
visions dealing with the executive and legislative powers in the
Constitution of the United States ;29 furthermore, the court, when
its attention was drawn to the precedents afforded by the Smith-
sonian Institute and other bodies whose officials for a period of
many years had been elected by Congress, admitted the practice,
failed to challenge the validity of these legislative exercises of
the appointive power and sought to find a distinction between
stock companies such as the National Coal Company, and non
stock organizations "of like character" to the Smithsonian.- The
implications of this distinction are interesting and will be dis-
cussed later.8 1 At this point it is sufficient to note that the prob-
lem, so far as the appointive powers of the United States Con-
gress over the new governmental corporations are concerned,
cannot be regarded as settled by the decision in the Springer
case, even if we give weight to its somewhat broad dicta which
admittedly strayed beyond the scope of the actual facts in the
case.32 It is, then, important to examine the principles which may
influence the Court should it in the future be called on to define
the powers of Congress in the premises.
III.
Of primary importance in determining whether the managers
of a government corporation can be appointed by Congress or
a body under congressional control is the question whether these
managers are officers of the United States government. If so, the
doctrine of Myers v. The United States would seem to conclude
that their appointment must be vested in the executive. One
means of escape from this conclusion may rest in the extent to
which the courts have gone in conceding to the government cor-
poration an independent corporate entity; for by clothing the
corporation with a distinct personality it may be possible so to
isolate its managers as to render them not servants of the govern-
ment, but rather of the corporation. The familiar example of
the corporate director who is the agent of the corporation but
not of the shareholders will immediately present itself.
In many respects this separate personality has been judicially
respected. As noted above, the corporation and not the govern-
29 U. S. Const. Art. II sec. 1; U. S. Const. Art. II sec. 2; and see note
(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 426.
30 Springer v. Philippine Islands, supra note 27 at p. 204.
31 See page 240-1 infra.
32McReynolds dissented on the ground that the majority opinion "goes
much beyond the necessities of the case." He chose to rest his opinion on
the specific words of the Organic Act.
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ment has been held liable to suit on contract or in tort.33 In one
case a contract was signed "United States of America, By United
States Shipping Board"; below this the Fleet Corporation added
its own corporate signature. The contract was held solely that
of the Fleet Corporation; the court declared "A corporation, as
such, has no authority to sign the name of its stockholder to a
contract and bind him as sole or joint obligor."3 4 On the other
hand, the War corporations were exempted from state taxation.3 5
And they have been held entitled to the lower rates required to
be given by the Western Union Telegraph Company to "com-
munications between the several departments of the government
and their officers and agents."36 Whether the corporation can
plead sovereign immunity from garnishment is a matter of con-
flict. 3 T These diverse holdings are supported by various rationali-
zations. The intent of Congress perhaps is given predominate
attention.38 Other cases hold that when the government engages
in commercial activity it doffs sovereign prerogatives.3 9 This will
merit further discussion later.41 A substantial number of deci-
sions, however, rest firmly on the ground that the corporation is
a separate entity and as such is not to be confused with the
government. 41 The corporate form as an isolating factor was
38 Supra note 10. And see U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation v. Hardwood
(1929) 281 U. S. 519, holding that parties contracting with the Fleet Cor-
poration could look only to the corporate assets for satisfaction.
34 U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation v. Tabas (C. C. A. 3, 1927) 22 Fed.
(2nd) 398, at p. 400.
35 Supra note 12.
36 U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation v. Western Union Telegraph Company
(1928) 275 U. S. 415. But compare Commercial Pacific Cable Company v.
Philippine National Bank (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920) 263 Fed. 218, affirmed
269 Fed. 1022. Again the War may have influenced the former decision.
37 Pro: McCarthy v. U. S. S. B. Merchant Fleet Corporation (C. C. A.
1931) 53 Fed. (2nd) 923; certiorari denied 285 U. S. 547, ("it (the corpora-
tion) functions as an instrumentality or department of the government").
Con: Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Company (1920) 268 Pa. 92, 110
At]. 788; Commonwealth Finance Co. v. Landis (D. C. F. D. Pa. 1919) 261
Fed. 440.
88 The Lake Monroe (1919) 250 U. S. 246; Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. S.
B. Fleet Corporation (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1919) 261 Fed. 716.
s9 See Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation supra note 38,
at p. 718; Federal Sugar Refining Company v. United States Sugar Equali-
zation Board Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 575, at p. 587; and see
Western and Atlantic Ry. v. Carlton (1858) 28 Ga. 180.
40 See p. 239 ff. infra.
41 Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia (1824) 9
Wheaton 904-this case, however, contains germs both of the separate
entity theory and of the commercial enterprise theory. See p. 908; Lindgren
v. U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation (C. C. A. 4, 1932) 55 Fed. (2nd) 117,
certiorari denied 286 U. S. 542; Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. U. S. S. B.
United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corporation v. McCarl (19270 275
U. S. 1 Fleet corporation (1922) 258 U. S. 549, at p. 565; Panama Railway
v. Curran (C. C. A. 5, 1919) 256 Fed. 768; 35 Ops. Atty. Gen. 490 (1928;
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stressed in United States v. Strang 42 where it was held that an
inspector of the Fleet Corporation was not affected by a provi-
sion of the criminal code that no officer or member of a firm
contracting with the United States should be an agent of the
United States; the agents of the Fleet Corporation were held
agents of an entity separate from the United States, being ap-
pointed and removed not by the President or Congress (sic) but
solely by officers of the Fleet Corporation. The court said, "gen-
erally agents of a corporation are not agents of the stockholders
and cannot contract for the latter. Apparently this was one
reason why Congress authorized organization of the Fleet Cor-
poration." 43 Similarly it has been held that the holding of office
in the Fleet Corporation did not prevent one from holding an-
other office under the government, as this did not constitute the
forbidden holding of two federal offices. 44 It has been said that
the officers of the Panama Railway Company, the stock in which
is owned by the United States, are not by that fact officers of the
United States.45 Nor, apparently, do the Civil Service require-
ments apply to the personnel of these organizations.' " These
analogies are persuasive. Certainly the possibility suggests itself
that Congress might deal with the government corporation in
the role of the shareholder in the private concern; as the owner
of stock it might not only vote upon fundamental policies, but
elect directors as well. This admittedly is to indulge the cor-
porate form to the utmost, yet the project is not lacking in logi-
cal justification. Innumerable difficulties naturally arise. In
many cases the government corporation is organized by adminis-
trative officers under the general incorporation laws of a state.40
Except in questions of citizenship the courts have made little
distinction between these and corporations created by Congress.
Obviously, however, Congress will enjoy less practical and per-
National Home for Disabled Veteran Soldiers v. Parrish (1912) 229 U. S.
494; Cox v. Lykes Brothers (1924) 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 226.
42 (1921) 254 U. S. 491.
43Ibi. at p. 492.
44Dalton v. United States (1931) 71 Court of Claims 421. And see
Osborn v. Bank of the United States (1824) 9 Wheaton 738 at 866.
45 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 19 (1908); and see, for managers of the National
Home for Soldiers, 26 Ops. Atty. Gen. 457 (1907). Contra see Holden v.
University Ry. (1869) 63 N. C. 410, where said that directors of state owned
railroad were "officers" of the state; State ex rel. Howerton v. Tate (1873)
68 N. C. 546, where the court declined to decide whether the directors of a
state owned railroad company were legally officers of the state, but never-
theless decided that such must be appointed by the governor and not by the
legislature. The constitutional provisions of North Carolina, however, were
decidedly explicit in denying appointing power to the legislature.
451 37 Ops. Atty. 1 (1932); but see Civil Service Arts and Rules,
(amended to Sept. 15, 1934) at p. 45.
4 See Field, Government Corporations, a Proposal (1935) 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 775; and consult note 6 supra.
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haps also less legal control over the personnel of such adminis-
tratively organized corporations. Another distinction is that be-
tween stock and non stock corporations drawn by the court in
Springer v. Philippine Islands. It is difficult to see the rationale
behind this. The possible complications, however, are numerous;
at this stage one is forced to be content with propounding rather
than with answering questions.
Accordingly, reliance upon the corporate form to isolate direc-
tors and managers from the appointive power of the executive
by no means can afford a definite solution. The factor of cor-
porate isolation is too variable to serve as a certain standard;
whether the courts will regard the government corporation as an
entity in itself or as a mere arm of the sovereign, in the past has
depended largely upon the interests involved and the practical
result desired to be attained. This procedure may possess merit
as a pragmatic method; but it renders prediction difficult.
IV.
A more fundamental approach to the problem will be concerned
with the functions rather than the form of the government cor-
poration. In South Carolina v. United States47 a distinction was
drawn between the functions of a state which were strictly
governmental and those of a commercial nature. If it is possible
to make such a distinction in the case of the activities of the
federal government, one might argue as did Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Springer v. Philippine Islands, that the directors
of a corporation engaged in commercial rather than govern-
mental activities are not governmental officers in the constitu-
tional sense, and hence that appointment of such by congress is
not an usurpation of the executive power. In a suit against the
Planters Bank of Georgia in which the state of Georgia owned
part of the stock, Marshall gave early expression to this possi-
bility: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a govern-
ment becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself,
so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sover-
eign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and prerogatives,
it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself,
and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the
business which is to be transacted. '' 48 That this reasoning equally
47 (1905) 199 U. S. 437. A liquor dispensary owned and operated by the
state of South Carolina was held taxable by the federal government; the
liquor business was held not a governmental activity within the traditional
definition; also the familiar in terrorem argument was given weight; the
court pointed out the possible decline in taxes to the national government
which would result if the states were to engage in business and plead
sovereign immunity from taxation of instrumentalities used in these activi-
ties.
48 (1824) Whraton 904, at pp. 907, 8.
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applies to situations where the state owns all the stock in the
corporation is indicated by a subsequent decision. 41 There is re-
spectable authority that the doctrine of liability to suit may rest
rather on the commercial nature of the enterprise than on the
corporate form.50
To what extent the national government constitutionally can
own stock in and operate corporations engaged in "commercial"
enterprises is at present a matter of acrimonious debate.r1 An
additional problem is whether all activities on the part of the
government are not necessarily always "public."r 2 An affirma-
tive answer to this question will result in denying the validity
ultimately of distinguishing between activities of a "commercial"
nature and those of a "governmental" nature, and hence, putting
aside for the moment the issue of corporate form, it would not be
possible to hold that the director of a governmentally owned en-
terprise was any less a "public officer" than one engaged in a more
traditional department of government. Something of this is im-
plicit in the majority opinion in Springer v. Philippine Islands."
Yet it would seem that in actuality there exists a practical dif-
ference of wide degree between purely governmental and pro-
prietary or commercial activities even though both are entered
into by the sovereign. This distinction is not without weighty
judicial support.5 4
It is paradoxical that the majority opinion in the Springer case
declared that the legislature could not elect the directors of the
National Coal Company, engaged as it was in commercial enter-
prise, but admitted that Congress might appoint the managers
of corporations engaged in such traditionally governmental activ-
ities as the encouragement of arts and sciences, education and
49 Bank of Kentucky v. Wister (1829) 2 Peters 318.
50 See Gould Coupler Company v. U. S. S. B. Fleet Corporation (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1919) 261 Fed. 716, at 3 and especially see Ballaine v. Alaska
Northern Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 259 Fed. 183, where a government
owned corporation was held immune from suit because the United States
was acting in its "sovereign capacity" to transport mail, troops, etc.; the
court distinguished the holdings in the Panama Railway cases on the ground
that in the case of the latter the United States had entered into a "com-
mercial business," and that hence the government corporation was to be
treated as any other private corporation.
51 For recent competent discussions of the problem see Culp, Creation of
Government Corporations by the National Government (1935) 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 473; and note (1935) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 662.
52 "The government can never act in a private capacity, it is necessarily
always public." Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21
Va. L. Rev. at p. 449.
.5 Supra note 27.
54 Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, supra note 48;
and consult note 50 supra.
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public charity.5 The shoe, it would seem, should be on the other
foot.
The functional test places narrower limits to the number of
corporations the personnel of which Congress could control than
does the simpler test of mere corporate form. It is, however,
precisely the commercially engaged government corporations
which in the future may be in particular need of freedom from
political dictation by the executive. It is to be hoped that in such
an event the courts will be able to effect this liberation. The
combined factors of corporate form and participation in com-
mercial activities may assist the judicial process.
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER '35.
CORAM NOBIS IN MISSOURI
It might seem advisable as a matter of logical procedure in a
discussion concerning the nature and extent of the writ of error
cormm nobis that one's reasoning should start with the definition
of a judgment, and a consideration of the nature of a judicial
determination or sentence of a court in a cause within its juris-
diction. If we turn to that venerated authority Lord Coke, we
find that the learned judge characterized judgments as "the very
voyce of law and right."' It is true that every judgment directly
enforces some right or suppresses some wrong, thereby pro-
ducing the end sought by a humanely conceived law and that,
in truth, may be the "voyce of law and right."'* The meaning
of the word "judgment" as changed by the Missouri statute,
is defined as "the final determination of the right of the parties
in the action." 2 To start with the primary emphasis upon the
nature of a judgment demands that we never lose sight of the
fact that a judgment imports absolute verity, and is the highest
form of obligation. This is supported by the celebrated maxim:
It is to the interest of the state that litigation come to an end.3
A consideration, however, of the writ of error coram nobis
as one of the methods of vacating a judgment, seems to require
that the definition, nature and extent of this remedy should
be considered first, rather than that the nature of a judgment
be placed to the forefront. To accord the main emphasis to the
scope of the writ of error coram nobis does not mean that we
55 Supra page 236; and see examples of Congressional appointment cited
page 234.
'Co. Litt. 39 a. 1 Freeman on Judgments, 2.
11 1 Freeman on Judgments, 3.
2R. S. Mo. (1929), section 1070. Kansas City v. Wourshoeffer (1913)
249 Mo. 1, 155 S. W. 779; Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell Anchor Stone Co.
(1910) 225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486.
3 Jeude v. Sims (1914) 258 Mo. 26, 166 S. W. 1048.
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